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 Since the publication of Peter Fritzsche’s pioneering Nation of 
Fliers: German Aviation and the Popular Imagination in 1992, studies 
of air-mindedness and aviation in other national contexts have 
proliferated.1  In addition to works on Russia, Britain, and Thailand, a 
variety of monographs on American aviation history and culture have 
followed in Fritzsche’s flight path.2  Several valuable books on aircraft 
technology and the aviation industry in Japan have appeared in English 
as well, notably Richard Samuels’ “Rich Nation, Strong Army”: 
National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan, 
Mark Peattie’s Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909-
1941, and the translated memoirs of the chief engineer of the famed 
Mitsubishi Zero fighter.3  Even in this increasingly crowded historical 
literature, Jürgen Melzer’s ambitious volume on the development of 
Japanese aviation in a specifically transnational context is a welcome 
and eye-opening addition.  Although at its heart Melzer’s book is a 
study of technology transfer and the emergence of domestic design and manufacturing capabilities 
in the Japanese aviation industry, it ranges widely across military strategy and international 
relations, media cultures and popular sentiments, and the political economy of flight in modern 
Japan. 
 Wings for the Rising Sun pivots on three central arguments, each of which Melzer 
supports with ample (and often richly detailed) evidence.  First, he argues that the history of 
Japanese aviation is a thoroughly transnational one, with aeronautical knowledge and innovation 
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circulating constantly from the late nineteenth century among European, American, and Japanese 
engineers, industrialists, and military leaders.  Second, Melzer asserts that the process of 
technology transfer and Japan’s ultimate achievement of technological autonomy from the West 
were based on a technological system that fused the military, industry, and structured but flexible 
learning from abroad in a way that (to borrow Melzer’s oxymoron) “institutionalized innovation.”  
Finally, as in Germany and other nations committed to the advance of airpower, public enthusiasm 
for aviation, stoked by the media and strongly tinged with nationalism in the decades prior to 
World War II, played a critical role in propelling the rapid growth of the Japanese aircraft industry. 
 Melzer’s volume is essentially chronological in organization, starting with the 
mania for ballooning in the late nineteenth century.  Balloons were one of the spectacular new 
technologies that flooded into Japan after the Meiji Restoration and which captured the public 
imagination.  They also caught the eye of the Japanese military, which was acutely aware of its 
relative technological backwardness and was actively seeking out the most up-to-date innovations 
from the West.  The Japanese Naval Academy launched the nation’s first manned balloon in 1877 
and by the 1890s precocious Japanese inventors were creating novel designs and building larger 
(and later, engine-powered) airships.  Although the Army successfully deployed balloons for 
reconnaissance at the Siege of Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese War, the poor safety and 
reliability records of lighter-than-air vessels soured military officials on them.  Moreover, rapid 
progress in Western airplane technology and the vision of “battleships in the air” soon captivated 
Japanese military planners.  Thus, in December 1910 (not even seven years after the Wright 
Brothers made history at Kitty Hawk), a biplane imported from France and piloted by a Japanese 
Army captain took to the skies from the Yoyogi military parade ground in Tokyo, in front of a 
raucous crowd of 100,000 people, achieving Japan’s first motorized flight. 
The rivalry between the Army and Navy in Imperial Japan is well known and, as Melzer 
documents, profoundly shaped the progress of Japanese aviation from its earliest days.  The two 
services were notoriously secretive and competitive in their development of new technologies, 
independent in their strategic visions of military aviation, and distinct in their practices of working 
with private-sector suppliers and overseas partners.  Mirroring this bifurcation, Melzer looks first 
at the evolution of Army airpower, which initially surged during World War I, before 
concentrating on naval aviation, which was somewhat slower to develop due to the Navy’s fixation 
on capital ships and firepower.  In both cases, he periodizes his narrative based on the shifting 
influence of foreign nations on Japanese aviation as the prime inspiration for Japanese designers 
and manufacturers waxed and waned over time in response to the perceived technological prowess 
of various nations (and as Japanese access to foreign technologies and expertise) rose and fell. 
 In the 1910s, as France was generally regarded as the leading nation in aeronautical 
technology, the Japanese Army dispatched pilots to be trained there and procured aircraft from 
French firms.  World War I, in which the Japanese fought on the Allied side, affirmed the rising 
importance of airpower: Japanese planes engaged inconclusively with German aircraft over 
Qingdao in 1914 and logged a total of 135 sorties and 234 bombings.  In order to build Japan’s 
capabilities in aviation design, manufacturing, and operation, the Japanese government appealed 
to the French for assistance.  The military authorities in Paris, eager to maintain their influence in 
Japan and assist an ally, provided a large team of French officers, flight instructors, and 
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aeronautical experts to Japan to train pilots, factory workers, and engineers.  The high-profile 
delegation further spurred public enthusiasm for aviation, which had surged with breathless reports 
from the skies over Qingdao. 
 After the Armistice, however, it became increasingly obvious to Japanese Army 
planners that technological leadership in aviation had passed from the French to the Germans 
during the course of the war.  Conveniently for Japan, the peace settlement provided an opportunity 
to transfer German technology and expertise to Japan’s fledgling air forces and aircraft industry.  
As one of the victorious powers, Japanese officials had the opportunity to inspect German aviation 
facilities in great detail and Japan later received a share of the German aircraft and aeronautical 
equipment that was distributed among the Allies as reparations.  The Japanese were also eager to 
hire skilled pilots, engineers, and workmen from Germany, who were underemployed after the 
war, and to acquire additional technological innovations from German aircraft manufacturers.  The 
Versailles Treaty prohibited such arrangements, but the Japanese Army, committed to building up 
its air arm and developing an independent domestic aviation industry, found a series of 
workarounds that allowed German know-how to flow almost unimpeded into Japan during the 
1920s. 
 Particularly important to this intensive process of technology transfer were the 
establishment of key corporate partnerships between German and Japanese firms and the 
employment of leading German engineers by Japanese aircraft manufacturers.  Kawasaki, for 
example, linked up with the German manufacturer Dornier and soon emerged as an international 
leader in the design of metal monoplane bombers.  At Mitsubishi, which partnered successfully 
with Junkers to improve its engineering and fabrication capacities, the engagement of Alexander 
Baumann (who had held Germany’s first professorship of aeronautical engineering) as a consultant 
and trainer was transformative.  A prominent symbol of Japan’s rapid advances in aviation 
technology was the design and construction of the Mitsubishi Type 92 Superheavy Bomber, the 
world’s largest bomber (and thus something of an aircraft analogue of the battleship Yamato), 
which made its maiden flight in 1931, just months after the Manchurian Incident.  The ponderous 
Type 92 was never used in combat but marked an important step in the achievement of an 
autonomous Japanese aviation industry and was a public relations triumph, inspiring raptures from 
a patriotic media and populace. 
 The Imperial Navy, meanwhile, despite a “big-ship, big-gun” fixation since the 
Russo-Japanese War, followed developments in Western naval aviation closely and sought to keep 
pace at a time when “military innovation became a dominant element of national security” (140).  
Unlike the Army, which came to depend entirely on private firms for new aviation technology, the 
Navy invested in centralized research and development facilities in aeronautics, partnering with 
civilian contractors in design and manufacture.  Although naval aviation drew upon German 
expertise after World War I (especially in the design of float planes, through a relationship between 
Heinkel and the Japanese aircraft maker Aichi), the major influence on Navy technology and 
strategy during the 1920s was from Great Britain.  British influence had been strong in the Japanese 
Navy from its very origins and it only seemed natural that British engineers, flight trainers, and 
test pilots flocked to Japan, individually and on government-sponsored missions.  The British 
impact was most obvious in the development of aircraft carriers and carrier-based planes: Japan’s 
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first carrier, the Hōshō, was modeled on the pioneering HMS Furious and was commissioned in 
1922; the nation’s first carrier-deck landing, cheered by the media and the general public, took 
place the following year with a Mitsubishi Type 10 Fighter, a new model designed and constructed 
with extensive British input. 
 After 1930, British influence on Japanese naval aviation declined rapidly, due 
partly to increasing interest in German and American technology, but more importantly, Melzer 
argues, because “Japan’s naval arsenals and civilian aircraft makers had caught up with and, in 
many respects, surpassed their former mentors” (170).  A key advance was the mastery of airframe 
fabrication during Duralumin, a strong, lightweight alloy developed in Germany and brought to 
Japan through a cooperative agreement between Mitsubishi and the leading aircraft designer Adolf 
Rohrbach. Interwar naval arms limitation agreements—the Washington Treaty of 1922 and the 
London Treaty of 1930—spurred the development of naval aviation as the treaty restrictions did 
not extend to carriers or aircraft. By the mid-1930s, as Japan designed and built advanced float 
planes and carrier-based aircraft, came to lead the world in dive-bombing technology, and laid 
down a new generation of potent aircraft carriers, Japanese naval aviation had achieved what 
Melzer calls “technological independence.” 
 Even as the technology gap between Japan and the leading European powers 
narrowed and eventually disappeared, Japanese naval planners and engineers continued to look 
abroad for inspiration and innovation.  In the years leading up to Pearl Harbor, it was the American 
aircraft industry that caught their attention.  U.S. military aviation had long languished, but 
American civil aviation flourished, even during the Depression.  In the 1930s, Japanese aircraft 
makers absorbed and indigenized American technology in engine and propeller design, adapted 
U.S. commercial planes for military uses, and, above all, sought to transfer advanced American 
manufacturing techniques based on Fordist mass production and the use of specialized machine 
tools.  Until 1940, even as U.S.-Japanese tensions in the Pacific were escalating rapidly (due 
largely to Japanese bombing of civilian targets in China and the sinking of the American gunboat 
Panay by Japanese aircraft in 1937), Japanese missions to the United States continued to have 
access to American aviation factories and were able to buy large quantities of American machine 
tools.  As Melzer convincingly shows, American observers consistently underestimated and 
disparaged Japanese advances in aviation, despite the fact that Japanese-designed and built aircraft 
were setting records for speed and flight range in the late 1930s. 
 Achievements during World War II in jet and rocket propulsion were a testament 
not just to the technological capabilities of Japanese aeronautical engineers and manufacturers, but 
also to their resourcefulness and resilience under extraordinarily trying circumstances.  The 
Japanese Army had begun experimenting with rocketry in the 1930s but the Navy only started in 
1942, when war planners started to pin their hopes on revolutionary new technologies that could 
turn the tide against a foe with far greater material resources.  Progress was slow until 1944, when 
the German Ministry of Aviation shared very basic plans for a jet engine with Japanese naval 
engineers.  Within the span of just a year, Japanese technologists overcame “grueling time 
pressure, dwindling resources, and the constant threat of all-out air raids” (236) to design and 
fabricate airframes, engines, and propellants.  Just weeks prior to the dropping of the atomic bombs 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, two revolutionary Japanese aircraft—Mitsubishi’s rocket-powered 
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Shūsui and Nakajima’s Kikka jet—took off on their first test flights, one abortive, the other 
successful.  In the end, Japanese jets and rockets came too late to make any contribution to the war 
effort, but they demonstrated that “Japan’s aviation technology once more has overtaken that of 
[its] wartime enemies” (262). 
 Melzer ends his book with a short epilogue on the postwar period, stressing 
transwar continuities and, above all, the enduring “close connection among the industry, military, 
and public [that was] a unique feature that defined the development of aviation in Japan” (264).  
Arguing that the postwar rebirth of Japanese aircraft manufacturing was “a replay of its pre-1945 
history, when the country evolved from a late starter to a major player,” Melzer shows how the 
Japanese government and private firms carefully managed technology transfer, navigated complex 
geopolitics, and regained technological independence and a record of innovative design. 
 More than anything, Wings for the Rising Sun shows remarkable breadth.  Melzer 
does an admirable job of providing a holistic view of Japanese military aviation, having avoided 
the temptation to make his research more manageable by focusing on just one of the military 
services, or on the influence of a particular foreign country (such as Germany), or on a single 
Japanese aircraft manufacturer or arsenal.  Although Mitsubishi figures prominently in Melzer’s 
story (both before and after World War II), he touches at least briefly upon every major military 
aircraft producer in Japan’s highly fragmented prewar aviation industry.  Melzer also successfully 
situates his analysis at the intersection of business history, the history of technology, diplomatic 
and international history, military history, and the history of Japanese mass media and culture.  He 
makes extensive use of corporate histories, where available.  He is much less thorough, however, 
in placing the aviation industry in the history of Japanese manufacturing and management, and he 
does not cite even the standard English-language sources in production and labor management 
here.  Nonetheless, one cannot help but be impressed by how much ground (or airspace?) Melzer 
covers in a relatively concise, tightly organized, and well-presented volume. 
Nevertheless, for all the important contributions of Wings for the Rising Sun, there are some 
disappointing aspects to Melzer’s treatment and a few curious omissions.  First, Melzer pays 
remarkably little attention to the celebrated Mitsubishi Zero fighter, presumably the best possible 
example of Japanese technological independence, not just in aviation, but in mechanical 
engineering in general prior to 1945.  Given the focus on the Zero in other English- and Japanese 
language sources on Japanese airpower, Melzer may well have considered a reiteration here 
unnecessary but, from the reader’s perspective (and for the sake of his overall arguments), it is 
missed in this otherwise quite thorough book.  Second, the volume’s striking cover image—a 
poster for Japan Air Transport, suggesting the romance of passenger air travel in the interwar 
period—seems an odd choice, even a deceptive one.  Wings for the Rising Sun is a very much a 
history of military aviation, with only incidental mention of the evolution of Japan’s civil and 
commercial aviation sectors.  This is not a broad study of air-mindedness, like Fritzsche’s path-
breaking book, or of the experience of flight, as the cover seems to connote.   
 Third, while Melzer makes much of Japan’s attainment of technological 
independence in aviation, he could have been considerably more explicit in detailing what this 
means and why it is significant.  Melzer documents well the thoroughness of Japanese aviators 
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and engineers in learning from the West and adapting Western technologies, making numerous 
incremental improvements in design.  But he provides no examples of Japanese engineers making 
substantial breakthroughs in aeronautical or production technology, nothing comparable to 
advances like Duralumin, the variable-pitch propeller, or turret launching of floatplanes (all 
European or American advances later adopted in Japan).  Moreover, Japanese aviation seemed to 
remain dependent on imported models even well after the point when Melzer asserts technological 
independence: Japanese arsenals and manufacturers continued to reverse engineer Western planes 
through most of the 1930s, American machine tools were critical to Japanese mass production of 
aircraft, and German innovations were essential to Japan’s wartime jet and rocket projects.   
 Fourth and finally, Wings for the Rising Sun is very much a free-standing narrative 
and Melzer does not engage directly with the secondary literature, either in the book’s text or in 
the notes.  What is particularly surprising (and unfortunate) is that Melzer does not specifically 
address Samuels’ “Rich Nation, Strong Army” which focuses, like this study, on Japanese military 
aviation, on international flows of technology, and on the relationships among military planners, 
bureaucrats, engineers, and industrialists in the development of Japanese airpower.  Although 
Melzer’s conclusions appear broadly consistent with Samuels’, Wings for the Rising Sun lacks 
social scientific rigor in defining and generalizing concepts of potential broad utility like 
“institutionalized innovation.”  Melzer also misses the opportunity where he goes well beyond 
Samuels’ analysis—as with his transnational contextualization of Japanese aviation or his 
emphasis on popular media—to demonstrate just how novel and valuable his approach and this 
study can be.  In spite of these shortcomings, Wings for the Rising Sun is a rich and thought-
provoking source for anyone interested in the story of aviation, the process of technology transfer 
and innovation, and the public enthusiasm for flying machines in modern Japan. 
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